

The Effect of Minority Bank Ownership on Minority Credit

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Discussion by

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Summary

- Question
 - ▶ How and why does minority ownership affect minority credit?
- Approach
 - ▶ Summarize lending behavior across bank type
 - ▶ Compare outcomes across race of lender-borrower matches
 - ▶ DiD exploiting bank failure for minority-owned bank
- Key Results
 - ▶ MO Banks: More real estate, portfolio loans, minority borrowers
 - ▶ Same-race matches: Ownership has sizeable effect on approval rates and delinquency
 - ▶ Bank failures: Negative effect from relationship breakdown
- Comments
 - ▶ Relevant Control
 - ▶ Empirical Design
 - ▶ Additional Channels

Relevant Control

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 - ▶ Defaults: Other-race borrowers at Same-Race Bank

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- Mechanism: Minority Ownership relative to Minority Boards

Empirical Design

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- Sharp test: Loan renegotiation
 - ⇒ Supply side: Peripheral counties
 - ⇒ Demand side: Already originated

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- Borrowers **Push To** Minority Owners
 - ▶ Do minority borrowers prefer MO Banks?
 - ▶ Test: Do minorities respond to credit expansions?

Conclusion

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- Paper tackles important policy question using rich data
- Involved approach provides several angles at complex problem
- Could pin down mechanism using alternative designs and channels